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MEMORANDUM FOR THE OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR
RWANDA

______________________________________________________________________________
ISSUE:

INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY FOR THOSE WHO ESTABLISH OR CONTROL INSTRUMENTS OF
GOVERNMENT

SPECIFICALLY ADDRESSING THE ARGUMENT TO WHAT EXTENT, AND HOW FAR CAN RELIANCE
ON AN ACCUSED’S PARTICIPATION IN THE ESTABLISHMENT AND/OR CONTROL OF THE
INSTRUMENTS OF GOVERNMENT THAT SPEARHEADED/MASTERMINDED A GENOCIDE AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL CRIEMS, TAKE THE PROSECUTOR IN ESTABLISHING THE CRIMINAL
CULPABILITY OF AN ACCUSED?
______________________________________________________________________________

Prepared by William Clifford Ferrell
J.D. Candidate, May 2009
Fall Semester, 2007
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I. Introduction and Summary of Conclusions
A. Scope
This memorandum is to investigate the limits that one can be held liable for their control or
establishment of instruments of Government that is involved in the perpetuation of genocide or
other international crimes.* Instruments of government include state owned radio stations, state
supported paramilitary groups, and state operated death sites. Furthermore compliance with the
interim government helped to facilitate the genocide. The prosecutor of the International
Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda (ICTR) has to indict and prosecute Rwandan nationals who
perpetrated the crime of genocide in Rwanda in 1994. Due to the mixture of civilians in the
public and private sector along with the military there is the need to prosecute not only those
who were actively involved with the government instruments but those who supported them.1
For this reason this memo seeks to determine what limits the prosecution of the ICTR has in
pursuing the prosecution of those individuals involved in the establishment, implementation or
control of government instruments that committed acts of genocide or other international war
crimes n the scope of individual responsibility.

*

Participation in government as establishment of culpability:
“To what extent, and how far can reliance on an accused’s participation in the establishment
and/or control of the instruments of Government that spearheaded/masterminded a genocide
and other international crimes, take the Prosecutor in establishing the criminal culpability of
an accused?”

1

See, e.g., Mark D. Maxell & Sean M. Watts, ‘Unlawful Enemy Combatant’: Status, Theory of
Culpability, or Neither?’, 5 J. Int’l. Crim. Just. 19, (2007) (describing the lawfulness of an
individual to participate in combat) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 37]. It may be
worth noting that members of militias may be recognized as combatants, thus precluding them
from prosecution as long as they do not violate the international laws and customs of war. This is
clarified in Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) Adopted by the
Conference art. 50, June 8, 1977, 16 I.L.M 1391 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I]. (defining
civilian class as ‘persons who are not members of the armed forces) [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 4]
1

B. Summary of Conclusions
i. The Theory of Superior Responsibility Allows for the Prosecution of
Commanders for the Actions of their Subordinates
Regardless of whether or not the personal involved are from the military or the civilian
sector, the theory of superior responsibility is a venue that allows for the direct indictment of
superiors for actions committed by their subordinates. A commander can be punished for the
failure to prevent or punish the crimes of their subordinate. The actions of local government
officials in particular in the role with the state sponsored militias can be prosecuted under this
theory.
ii. The Theory of Superior Responsibility can be Applied to Internal Conflicts
Despite the lack of precedent for international conflicts, it is acceptable to apply the
theory of superior responsibility to internal conflicts. Due to the implied application of the theory
from international law and the application of the theory by the ICTY Tribunal for events that
occurred prior to the Rwandan Genocide, the ICTR has rightfully accepted the theory despite the
fact that it is being applied to an internal conflict.
iii. The Joint Criminal Enterprise Theory can be Used by Prosecutors to Indict
Individuals who Control or Implement Government Instruments that
Participate in the act of Genocide or other International Crimes
The joint criminal enterprise theory as established by the ICTY can and has been used to
prosecute individuals who have controlled or established government instruments that implement
the act of genocide or other international crimes. The theory of joint criminal enterprise will be
useful to assist prosecutors in indicted individuals who worked to achieve a common plan. For
example, members of state sponsored radio and local government officials helped to establish
and distribute orders to the militias. Under the three categories of joint criminal enterprise there

2

will be the legal foundation to prosecute those who did not physically perpetrate the crimes yet
were involved in a common plan.
iv. The ICTR Recognizes and can Apply the Theory of Joint Criminal Enterprises
in the Tribunal
Despite early ruling by the ICTR Trial Chambers that dismissed the theory of joint
criminal enterprises, the prosecution can now use the theory of joint criminal enterprise. In
particular, case law since 2004 from the ICTR Appeals Chamber has recognized the theory and
accepted the premises behind it by applying case law from the ICTY.
v. Actus Reus for Type III Joint Criminal Enterprise can be Ddetermined
The actus reus requirement for the extended category of joint criminal enterprise can be
determined. This can be determined principally from case law developed in the ICTY Chambers
and recently applied to the ICTR Chambers. Specifically, the nature of the assistance and the
effect of the assistance will be the two major points in determining whether or not an individual
can be indicted for their participation in a category three joint criminal enterprise.
vi. Foreseeability requirement for Type III Joint Criminal Enterprise can be
Determined
The foreseeability requirement for the extended category of joint criminal enterprises can
be determined. Determined principally from the fact that a reasonable outcome taken by the
accused would result in the crime being committed, it is sufficient that only one out of a series of
crimes was foreseeable.
vii. Unlikely to Prosecute an Individual Under Both Theories of Superior
Responsibility and Joint Criminal Enterprise
To successfully indict and prosecute an accused individual for their command role in
perpetrating genocide or another international war crime, they can be charged under the theory of
joint criminal enterprise or superior responsibility. An indictment under joint criminal enterprise

3

indicates that the individual actively participated in the common plan or purpose of the crime,
whereas an indictment under the theory of superior responsibility indicates that they failed to act
to prevent or punish the violation from occurring.
II. Factual Background
Traditional ethnic rivalry between the Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups dominated the
societal landscape of Rwanda since it was colonized by Belgium. The Rwandan Genocide began
on April 6 1994 when Hutu President Juvenal Habyarimana’s plane was shot down.2 Returning
from negotiations with Tutsi rebels, the assassination resulted in the Hutu population
orchestrating the genocide of the Tutsi population along with moderate Hutus. It is estimated that
the genocide resulted in the death of roughly 800,000 people3, or more than ten percent of the
population of Rwanda.
All social levels of society perpetrated the genocide. The United Human Rights Council
stated “[t]he killers were aided by members of the Hutu professional class including journalists,
doctors and educators, along with unemployed Hutu youths and peasants who killed Tutsis just
to steal their property.”4 The BBC corroborated that “[t]he early organizers included military
officials, politicians and businessmen, but soon many other joined in the mayhem.” 5 The high

2

C. SCHELTEMA & W. VAN DER WOLF, THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA: FACTS
157 (1999) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 32].
3

Genocide in Rwanda, United Human Rights Council,
http://www.unitedhumanrights.org/Genocide/genocide_in_rwanda.htm (last visited Nov. 25,
2007) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 42].
4

Id.

5

Rwanda: How the genocide happened, BBC News (Apr. 1, 2004),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/1288230.stm. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab
43].

4

level of organization amongst the militias and the rapid response to the assassination of President
Habyarimana heavily implies that the genocide was planned in advance.
The initial outburst of violence was against opposition politicians, spreading to dissenting
civilians, and finally to the general Tutsi population.6 It is noted that “[i]t thus seems that the
killings were no spontaneous outbursts, but followed instructions from the highest levels.”7
Three days after the death of President Habyarimana on April 6, 1994, an interim government
was established.8 It is to be noted that “[t]he interim government did very little to stop, or even
oppose, the massacres going on in the country.”9 One example of the government colluding with
the militias to coordinate the genocide was through the radio. “In addition, a very efficient and
effective campaign of disinformation was being waged by the most active media at that time,
TRLMC and Radio Rwanda.”10 Church officials gave their tacit approval to the genocide, as “the
Anglican archbishop refused unequivocally to denounce the Rwandan interim government.”11
Due to the collusion between civilians in the public and private sector with military
forces to perpetrate the genocide, there is a need for the prosecution of the ICTR to be able to
hold liable those responsible for establishing, implementing and controlling the instruments of
government which perpetrated those acts, regardless of their status of civilian or military.
III. Legal Discussion
6

See, SCHELTEMA, supra note 2, at 159-160 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 32].

7

Id. at 160

8

Id. at 161.

9

Id.

10

Id.

11

Id. at 162
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A. Applicable ICTR Statutory Provisions
i. Statutes Affected by Individual Responsibility
Article 2 of the ICTR Statute lists genocide as a crime that is punishable.12 The Trial
Chambers describes the elements of genocide as:
“proven if it is established beyond a reasonable doubt, firstly, that one of the acts listed
under Article 2(2) of the Statute was committed and, secondly, that this act was committed
against a specifically targeted national, ethnical, racial or religious group, with the specific
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, that group.”13
Only these elements are met can an individual directly responsible be prosecuted for the crime of
genocide.
Article 3 of the ICTR Statute lists crimes against humanity as a crime that is punishable. 14
The Trial Chambers in Akayesu describe the elements of crime against humanity as:
“(i) the act must be inhumane in nature and character, causing great suffering, or serious
injury to body or to mental or physical health; (ii) the act must be committed as part of a
wide spread [sic] or systematic attack; (iii) the act must be committed against members of
the civilian population; (iv) the act must be committed on one or more discriminatory
grounds, namely, national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds.”15
12

Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda art. 2, Nov. 8, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1598
[hereinafter ICTR Statute]. available at http://69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/basicdocs/statute/2004.pdf
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 1].
13

Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR 95-1A-T, Judgment, ¶ 55 (Jun. 7, 2001)
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 6]. Cited in GENOCIDE, WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES
AGAINST HUMANITY: TOPICAL DIGESTS OF THE CASE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA 12 (Jennifer Trahan & Adela Mall eds., 2004) [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 35].
14

ICTR Statute, supra note 12, art. 3[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 1].

15

Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 578 (Sep. 2, 1998) [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 7]. Cited in GENOCIDE, WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST
HUMANITY: TOPICAL DIGESTS OF THE CASE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
FOR RWANDA AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 33
(Jennifer Trahan & Adela Mall eds., 2004) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 35].
6

Only once these elements are met by a direct perpetrator can an individual be prosecuted for
crimes against humanity.
Article 4 of the ICTR Statute lists war crimes as a punishable crime.16 The Trial Chamber
in Kayishema held there must be:
(1) ”armed conflict … of a non-international character,” (2) a “link between the accused
and the armed forces,” (3) “the crimes must be committed ratione loci and ratione
personae,” and (4) “there must be a nexus between the crime and the armed conflict.”17
Once these elements are met can the direct perpetrator be held responsible for war crimes.
However, in order for a person not directly involved in the perpetration of these acts to be
tried individual responsibility must be established for the accused18. The ICTY Trial Chambers
in Milosevic noted that “it is not alleged that he physically committed the crimes personally, but
that he participated in the joint criminal enterprise”19
ii. Statutes Applicable to Individual Responsibility

16

ICTR Statute, supra note 12, art. 4 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 1].

17

Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR 95-1-T, Judgment, ¶ 169 (May 21 1999)
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 8]. Cited in Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes
Against Humanity: Topical Digests of the Case law of the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 50-51 (Jennifer
Trahan & Adela Mall eds., 2004) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 35].
18

See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 578 (Sep. 2, 1998)
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 7]. Cited in Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes
Against Humanity: Topical Digests of the Case law of the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 50 (Jennifer Trahan
& Adela Mall eds., 2004) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 35].
19

Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-01-51-1, Decision on Review of Indictment, ¶ 7 (Nov.
12, 2001) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 18].

7

To prosecute individuals who established, implemented or controlled government
instruments that perpetrated the Rwandan Genocide there are two relevant statutory provisions
relevant to individuals who may not have directly perpetrated the crime. Article 6(1)20 and
Article 6(3)21 of the ICTR Statute deal with Individual Criminal Responsibility.
Article 6(1)22 of the ICTR Statute is used by prosecutors to indict and prosecute
individuals under the theory of joint criminal enterprises. The text states that:
“A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in
the planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in articles 2 to 4 of the
present Statute, shall be individually responsible for the crime.”
This practice was first developed by prosecutors in the ICTY under the corresponding Article
7(1)23 of the ICTY Statute.
Article 6(3)24 of the ICTR Statute is used by prosecutors to indict and prosecute
individuals under the theory of superior responsibility. The text states that:
“The fact that any of the acts referred to in articles 2 to 4 of the present Statute was
committed by a subordinate does not relieve his or her superior of criminal responsibility
if he or she knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit such
acts or had done so and the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures
to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof.”

20

ICTR Statute, supra note 12, art. 6(1) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 1].

21

ICTR Statute, supra note 12, art. 6(3) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 1].

22

ICTR Statute, supra note 12, art. 6(1) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 1].

23

Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia art. 7(1), May 25,
1993, 32 I.L.M 1192 [hereinafter ICTY Statute], available at http://www.un.org/icty/legaldoce/basic/statut/statute-feb06-e.pdf. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 2].
24

ICTR Statute, supra note 12, art. 6(3) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 1].

8

Although this was developed to assist prosecutions in the corresponding Article 7(3)25 of the
ICTY Statute, prosecutors in the ICTY it has used the theory of superior responsibility much
more sparingly than the theory of joint criminal enterprise.
B. Application of Theories of Individual Responsibility
i. Superior Responsibility
The theory of superior responsibility is another avenue for the prosecutions of individuals
in the chain of command. This theory is supported by Articles 6(3)26 and 7(3)27 of the ICTY and
ICTR statutes respectively.
The theory of holding superiors responsible for the actions of their subordinates first
originated in the trials subsequent to the conclusion of World War II. The first use of this would
by the Trial of General Tomoyuki Yamashita28 in the Tokyo Tribunals followed by such cases as
The General High Command Trial29 in the Nuremburg tribunal for example. These trials
cemented the concept that superiors could be held accountable for the actions of their
subordinates.
Military leaders were not the only ones who could be held liable for acts committed
under their command. Civilian leaders could also be held accountable for those who served

25

ICTY Statute, supra note 23, art. 7(3) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 2].

26

ICTR Statute, supra note 12, art. 6(3) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 1].

27

ICTY Statute, supra note 23, art. 7(3) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 2].

28

See Trial of General Tomoyuki Yamashita, United States Military Commission, Manila,
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directly beneath them.30 The importance of this is that the civilian leaders would be held
accountable in situations where the distinction between military and civilian control blur. For
example, in Rwanda, the collusion between the civilian government leaders, military, and
militias in perpetrating the crime meant that various parties were responsible for the atrocities
that were committed. It is important to note that in the situation of Rwanda, previously existing
power structures broke down. This opened the possibility of an individual exercising de jure or
de facto control and being prosecuted on the basis of Superior Responsibility.31 If liability were
to be restricted solely to members of the military organization, civilian leaders who helped to
orchestrate and direct the genocide would get away with the crimes incurring no liability.
The theory of superior responsibility contains three elements. First, there must be a
superior-subordinate relationship. Next the superior had to have knowledge that their subordinate
had or was about to commit the crime. Finally, the superior had to fail to prevent the commission
of the crime or punish the perpetrators.32 Only if all three of these elements are met can one be
successfully prosecuted under Article 6(3)33 of the ICTR statute.

30

See DARYL A. MUNDIS, Crimes of the commander: Superior Responsibility under Article 7(3)
of the ICTY Statute, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CASE LAW OF
THE ICTY 254-256 (Gideon Boas & William A. Schabas eds., 2003) [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 34].
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at Tab 33], construed in Kordic et al. (IT-95-14/2-T), Judgment, 26 February 2001, para. 401;
Blasikic (IT-95-14-T), Judgment, 3 March 2000, para. 294; Delalic et al. (IT-96-21-T),
Judgment, 16 November 1998, para. 346; Stakic (IT-97-24-T), Judgment, 31 July 2003, para.
457.
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a. Application of Superior Responsibility in an Internal Armed
Conflict
The doctrine of superior responsibility is traditionally only applied to international
conflicts in tribunals prior to the ICTY. This was established in the Nuremburg Tribunal along
with the Tokyo Military Commission. The concept that internal armed conflicts dealt solely
with is inferred from Articles 8634 and 8735 of Additional Protocol I which deals with
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Art 86. Failure to Act
1. The High Contracting Parties and the Parties to the conflict shall repress grave
breaches, and take measures necessary to suppress all other breaches, of the
Conventions or of this Protocol which result form a failure to act when under a duty
to do so.
2.
The fact that a breach of the Conventions or of this Protocol was committed by a
subordinate does not absolve his superiors form penal disciplinary responsibility, as
the case may be, if they knew, or had information which should have enabled them to
conclude in the circumstances at the time, that he was committing or was going to
commit such a breach and if they did not take all feasible measures within their power
to prevent or repress the breach.
Additional Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 86 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 4].
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Art 87. Duty of Commanders
1. The High Contracting Parties and the Parties to the conflict shall require military
commanders, with respect to members of the armed forces under their command and
other persons under their control, to prevent and, where necessary, to suppress and to
report to competent authorities breaches of the Conventions and of this Protocol.
2. In order to prevent and suppress breaches, High Contracting Parties and Parties to the
conflict shall require that, commensurate with their level of responsibility,
commanders ensure that members of the armed forces under their command are
aware of their obligations under the Conventions and this Protocol.
3. The High Contracting Parties and Parties to the conflict shall require any commander
who is aware that subordinates or other persons under his control are going to commit
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steps as are necessary to prevent such violations of the Conventions or this Protocol,
and, where appropriate, to initiate disciplinary or penal action against violators
thereof.
Additional Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 87 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 4].
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international armed conflicts and the lack of corresponding provisions in Additional Protocol II36
that deals with internal armed conflicts. The ICTR itself has indicted people under the theory of
joint criminal enterprise despite the fact that it is not explicitly enabled to. As stated by Sonja
Boelaert-Suominen:
“ In a similar vein, one should note that the ICTR Statute contains a provision on superior
responsibility even though it seems to prejudge the armed conflict in Rwanda as a noninternational armed conflict of the type referred to in Common Article 3 to the Geneva
Conventions and Additional protocol II. There fore, all ICTR judgments in which
accused are convicted on the basis of the principle of superior responsibility can be seen
as confirming the view that under contemporary international criminal law, this theory
applies to non-international armed conflicts as well..”37
The widespread use of this principle by the Prosecution in the ICTR is indicative that it
is an accepted practice in international law to prosecute on the basis of participation in a joint
criminal enterprise in an internal armed conflict.
The traditional defense against this claim would be one of nullum crimen sine lege.
Nullum crimen sine lege is a “principle of justice,”38 which means the concept of law in which
the accused is being prosecuted for is already established. The fact that “only out of sixteen
states surveyed (Belgium) had national legislation providing for such criminal liability” is a
deterrent to the theory that criminal liability has widespread acceptance amongst the states and is

36
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747, 773 (2001) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 38] Cited in MUNDIS, supra note
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an international custom.39 The ICTY recognized the principle of nullum crimen sine lege in its
prosecutions as:
“It follows from this principle that a criminal conviction can only be based on a norm
which existed at the time the acts or omission with which the accused is charged were
committed. The Tribunal must further be satisfied that the criminal liability in question was
sufficiently foreseeable and that the law providing for such liability must be sufficiently
accessible at the relevant time for it to warrant a criminal conviction and sentencing under the
head of responsibility by the Prosecution.”40
The principle of nullem crimen sine lege has also been established for the theory of joint
criminal enterprise.41
ii. Joint Criminal Enterprises
The application of “common purpose” or joint criminal enterprise to international courts was
established in the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. The Tadic case
established that there are three types of joint criminal enterprises: basic, systemic and extended.
42

Regardless of the category of joint criminal enterprise at issue, there are three elements that
must be proven.43 The first element is that there must be a plurality of persons.44 Secondly, a
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accompanying notebook at Tab 20].
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common purpose must exist amongst the group of individuals for the commission of a crime as
provided by the ICTY Statute.45 Finally, the accused had to have participated in the common
purpose.46
The first category of joint criminal enterprise recognized by the international tribunals is the
basic form of joint criminal enterprise. In this case, all of the co-perpetrators collaborated and
acted together to perpetrate the crime. The Ntakirutimana court described that as “[i]t is
represented by cases where all co-perpetrators, acting pursuant to a common purpose, possess the
same criminal intention.”47The mens rea requirement for the basic category of joint criminal
enterprise is that the accused should have participated in the commission of the crime and the
intended result of the common plan.48
The second type of joint criminal enterprise recognized by the international tribunals is a
“systemic” form of joint criminal enterprise. The Ntakirutimana court described this as “a variant
of the basic form, characterized by the existence of an organized system of ill-treatment.”49 The
difference between the “systemic” and “basic” forms of joint criminal liability is that “no

45

See id.
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See id.
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Prosecutor v. Ntakirutimana, ICTR-96-17-A, Judgment, ¶ 463 (Dec. 13, 2004) [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 10].
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See Prosecutor v. Kvocka, et al., Case No. IT-98-30/1-A, Judgment, ¶. 82 (Feb. 28, 2005)
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[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 10].
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previous plan or agreement is required.”50 As long as the individual is part of the system that
“discharges a task of some consequence”51 the individual could be prosecuted under this method
of joint criminal enterprise. The mens rea requirement for the systemic category of joint criminal
enterprise is that the accused had to have knowledge of the criminal system and the intent to
further it.52
Finally there is the “extended” form of joint criminal enterprise. The Ntakirutimana Chamber
stated that this type of joint criminal enterprise “concerns cases involving a common purpose to
commit a crime where one of the perpetrators commits an act which, while outside the common
purpose, is nevertheless a natural and foreseeable consequence of executing that common
purpose.”53 This type of joint criminal enterprise is used to prosecute individuals for collateral
damage due to the execution of a common plan.
One key difference between the “extended” form of joint criminal enterprises and the aiding
and abetting requirements explicitly stated in the text of Article 6(1)54 is the lack of knowledge in
the perpetrator. As noted by William Schabas,
“[i]t is distinct from aiding and abetting, in that there is no requirement that the accomplice
actually have knowledge of the intent of the principal perpetrator. The accomplice must share a
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‘common purpose’ of a criminal nature with the principal perpetrator, and the acts of the
principal perpetrator must be a natural and foreseeable consequence of the common purpose.”55
The issue is trying to determine which acts qualify as sufficient to meet the actus reus required
of the extended category of joint criminal enterprise and the degree of foreseeability required.
a. Explicit Agreement not Required for Prosecution Under Theory of
Joint Criminal Enterprise
The linking theme of a joint criminal enterprise is that there is a common plan or common
theme present. The question arises on whether there has to be a formal agreement to participate
in the joint venture common plan or whether participation alone is sufficient. The Appeals
Judgment from Krnojelac addressed this issue:
“The Appeals Chamber considers that, by requiring proof of an agreement in relation to
each of the crimes committed with a common purpose, when it assessed the intent to
participate in a systemic form of joint criminal enterprise, the Trial Chamber went
beyond the criterion set by the Appeals Chamber in the Tadic case. Since the Trial
Chamber’s findings showed that the system in place at the KP Dom sought to subject
non-Serb detainees to inhumane living conditions and ill-treatment on discriminatory
grounds, the Trial Chamber should have examined whether or not Krnojelac knew of the
system and agreed to it, without it being necessary to establish that he had entered into an
agreement with the guards and soldiers – the principal perpetrators of the crimes
committed under the system – to commit those crimes.”56
An individual who participates in a common plan or purpose within the framework of does not
require the presence of a stated plan or purpose. The Appeals Chamber in Kvocka stated in its
Judgment “The common purpose need not be previously arranged or formulated; it may
materialize extemporaneously.”57 It is clear that for the prosecution of an individual in a joint
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criminal enterprise the lack of an explicit agreement amongst the participants is not a bar for
prosecution.
b. Application of Joint Criminal Liability to the ICTR
While the Tadic case established the acceptance of the theory of joint criminal enterprise’
from the get go for the ICTY, the same cannot be said for the ICTR. Two trial chambers initially
rejected the application of ‘joint criminal enterprises’, with one refusing to convict on the basis58
of joint criminal enterprise. By 2003 however the Karemera Appeals Chamber allowed59 an
amendment to allege joint criminal enterprise.60 The hostile atmosphere to the theory of joint
criminal enterprise has lead to the prosecution not indicting the issue at trial. 61
This result is unexpected due to the sharp similarities between the ICTR and ICTY Statutes.
Article 7(1)62 of the ICTY Statute had been used to successfully indict and prosecute individuals
on the basis of joint criminal enterprise.63 Article 6(1)64 of the ICTR Statute contains identical
language. One could infer that due to the similarity in language that it could be expected that the
ICTR would apply the same standards to the ICTY statute.
58

See Prosecutor v. Gacumbitsi, Case No. ICTR-2001-64-T, Judgement, ¶. 289. (Jun. 17, 2004)
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 11].
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Appeal Against Trial Chamber III Decision of 8 October 2003 Denying Leave to File an
Amended Indictment, ¶ 27 (Dec. 19, 2003) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 12].
60
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Some of the difference in the application of the law can be attributed to the different legal
systems the tribunals incorporate. The Rwandan tribunal has been known to find different
decisions that run contrary to the ICTY. For example, in attempting to define complicity the
ICTR has found the basis for three different forms of complicity.65 This result is due to the lack
of a definition for the term “complicity” in the ICTR statute, allowing for an ICTR Trial
Chamber to adopt the definition of the Rwandan Penal Code.66
The Appeals Chamber intervened in Ntakirutimanai when it stated that “Given the fact that
both the ICTY and the ICTR have mirror articles identifying the modes of liability by which an
individual can incur criminal responsibility, the Appeals Chamber is satisfied that the
jurisprudence of the ICTY should be applied to the interpretation of Article 6(1) of the ICTR
Statute.”67 Due to this ruling in 2004, prosecutors are able to amend charges in the ICTR Trial
Chambers to include the theory of joint criminal enterprise.
c. Application of Joint Criminal Enterprise in an Internal Armed
Conflict
The only way for one to apply the concept of joint criminal enterprises, which prior to
the ICTY had only applied to international armed conflicts, would be if the concept of joint
criminal enterprises had previously been applied to internal conflicts.
The ICTR Trial Chamber “note[d] that in the Tadic Judgment, the appeals Chamber held
the view that the notion of a common design as a form of accomplice liability is firmly
established in customary international law. In addition, it is upheld, albeit implicit, in the Statutes
65

See SCHABAS, supra note 32, at 305 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 33].
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See Id. at 306.

67

Prosecutor v. Ntakirutimanai, Case No. ICTR-96-10-A, Judgement, ¶ 467-484 (Dec. 13, 2004)
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 10].
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of the International Criminal Tribunals.” 68 It is to be noted however, that despite the recognition
in ad hoc tribunals, the concept of joint criminal enterprises has been indoctrinated into the ICC
Statute to formally install it into the international criminal justice system to preclude future
claims that the accused were not on notice.69
d. Challenges to the Theory of Joint Criminal Enterprise
The application of joint criminal enterprises has not gone unchallenged as a concept of
international law. Despite its indoctrination by the ICTY Trial Chambers in the Tadic70 case and
the adoption by the ICTR Appeals Chamber in the Rwamakuba when “[t]he Bench concludes
that, similar to those ICTY cases, this Appeal challenges the indictment on the ground that it
does not relate to any of the violations indicated in Article 6…and may therefore proceed as of
right” 71 the theory of joint criminal enterprise is being challenged
In the dissenting opinion of Judge Lindholm, the Trial Chamber in Simic stated that
“[t]he so-called basic form of joint criminal enterprise does not, in my opinion, have any
substance of its own. It is nothing more than a new label affixed to a since long well-known
concept or doctrine in most jurisdictions as well as in international criminal law, namely co68
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perpetration.”72 While some like Judge Lindholm argue that the co-perpetration and joint
criminal enterprise are the same due to the substantial contribution required, it has been
countered that the mens rea required to prosecute a co-perpetrator differs from that of a member
of a joint criminal enterprise, thus leading to the proper separation of the two offenses.73
There is also a dispute over whether the theory of joint criminal enterprise properly
addresses the issue of intentionality. It is felt that the definition of intentionality is too broad as
applied by international law.74 Associate-in-Law Jens David Ohlin argues “Individuals must be
prosecuted for their actions, not for the associations; to do otherwise is to engage in guilt by
association.”75 Both of these contentions raise issues that will be addressed as the theory of joint
criminal enterprise is further developed in international criminal law.
iii. Joint Criminal Enterprise Liability in Contrast to Superior Responsibility
Liability
An individual can be indicted under both Articles 6(1)76 and 6(3)77 of the ICTR Statute.
However, there is a trend to convict using only one of the articles.78 The Blaskic Trial Chamber
noted that “[I]t would be illogical to hold a commander criminally responsible for planning,
instigating or ordering the commission of crimes and, at the same time, reproach him for not
72
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preventing or punishing them.”79 Depending upon the nature of the crime, the Office of the
Prosecutor in the ICTR should select whether to indict upon the basis of Article 6(1)80 or 6(3)81
concerning the direct role the individual had on the establishment, implementation or control of
the government instrument.
iv. Aiding and Abetting
The text of Article 6(1) of the ICTR Statute includes in the definition someone who
“aided and abetted.”82 This raises the issue that an individual can be prosecuted for their
involvement in a genocide or other internationally recognized war crime and not be a member of
a joint criminal enterprise.
It is to be noted that the ICTR explicitly separates the definitions for “aiding” and
“abetting”. The Trial Chamber in Semanza stated that “The terms ‘aiding’ and ‘abetting’ refer to
distinct legal concepts. The term ‘aiding’ means assisting or helping another to commit a crime,
and the term ‘abetting’ means encouraging, advising in the commission of a crime.”83 However,
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the Trial Chamber in Akayesu noted that “either aiding or abetting alone is sufficient to render
the perpetrator criminally liable.”84
The Appeals Chamber in Vasiljevic first clarified the discrepancy between aiding and
abetting and participation in a joint criminal enterprise in their judgement:
“(i) The aider and abettor carries out acts specifically directed to assist, encourage or lend
moral support to the perpetration of a certain specific crime (murder, extermination, rape,
torture, wanton destruction of civilian property, etc.), and this support has a substantial
effect upon the perpetration of the crime. By contrast, it is sufficient for a participant in a
joint criminal enterprise to perform acts that in some way are directed to the furtherance
of the common design.
(ii) In the case of aiding and abetting, the requisite mental element is knowledge that the
acts performed by the aider and abettor assist the commission of the specific crime of the
principal. By contrast, in the case of participation in a joint criminal enterprise, i.e. as a
co-perpetrator, the requisite mens rea is intent to pursue a common purpose.”85
To summarize, the difference between an individual who can be indicted for aiding and abetting
and an individual who participates in a joint criminal enterprise is that the individual who is aids
and abets merely participates in a single crime. An individual who participates in a series of
crimes in a common plan participates in a joint criminal.
The mental and contributive requirements present in the joint criminal enterprise parallel
those of one who aids and abets as well. The Appeals Chamber judgment in Kvocka stated that:
“The requirement that an aider and abettor must make a substantial contribution to the
crime in order to be held responsible applies whether the accused is assisting in a crime
committed by an individual or in crimes committed by a plurality of persons.
Furthermore, the requisite mental element applies equally to aiding and abetting a crime
committed by an individual or a plurality of persons. Where the aider and abettor only
84
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knows that his assistance is helping a single person to commit a single crime, he is only
liable for aiding and abetting that crime. This is so even if the principal perpetrator is part
of a joint criminal enterprise involving the commission of further crimes. Where,
however, the accused knows that his assistance is supporting the crimes of a group of
persons involved in a joint criminal enterprise and shares that intent, then he may be
found criminally responsible for the crimes committed in furtherance of that common
purpose as a co-perpetrator.”86
The difference between charging an individual for aiding and abetting and charging an individual
for participation in a joint criminal enterprise appears to solely rely upon the presence of a
common plan which elevates the accused to a co-perpetrator.
C. Extended Category of Joint Criminal Enterprise to Determine the Degree Required
to Prosecute for the Establishment or Implementation of Government Instruments
The Tadic court established that the tribunals recognized an “extended” category of joint
criminal enterprises. One of the key differences between the “extended” category and the
“basic” and “systemic” categories is that the mens rea requirement for the extended category of
tribunals differentiates.87 When prosecuting a ‘basic” or “systemic” form of a joint criminal
enterprise, it is unnecessary to prove the mens rea.88 The act of participation in the joint criminal
enterprise itself has been found to be sufficient to prosecute on that basis.
To find an individual liable for an “extended” participation in a joint criminal enterprise
requires a greater burden of proof to prove the mens rea requirement. The trial court in
Ntakirutimana discussed the mens rea requirement in greater detail:
“[T]he extended form of joint criminal enterprise, requires the intention to participate in
and further the common criminal purpose of a group and to contribute to the joint
86
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criminal enterprise or, in any event, to the commission of a crime by the group. In
addition, responsibility for a crime other than the one which was part of the common
design arise “only if, under the circumstances of the case, (i) it was foreseeable that such
a crime might be perpetrated by one or other members of the group and (ii) the accused
willingly took the risk – that is, being aware that such a crime was a possible
consequence of the execution of that enterprise, and with that awareness, the accused
decided to participate in that enterprise.”89
This raises two important issues. First, what is the actus reus that is required to hold one
liable for prosecution? Secondly, what degree of foreseeability is required to hold one liable for
their participation in a joint criminal enterprise?
i. Actus Reus
To prove ones participation in a “basic” or “systemic” joint criminal enterprise is to
demonstrate that the individual acted to enact a common plan. The Tadic appeal judgment noted
that “often ‘collective criminality will involve situations where all co-defendants, acting pursuant
to a common design, possess the same criminal intention.”90 This is in contrast to participation in
an “extended” joint criminal enterprise.
In participation of “extended” joint criminal enterprises the acts committed by the
perpetrators fall outside of the common design. This results in the dilemma in attempting to
define which acts constitute participation in an “extended” joint criminal enterprise. Would
participation in a private radio issuing orders to state ran militias constitute the proper actus reus
for being indicted under the theory of joint criminal enterprise? What about a local mayor who
organizes a militia to help establish a government instrument that commits acts of genocide? Or
what if you’re a local official who helps to gather the Tutsi in a central location and gives the

89

The Prosecutor v. Ntakirutimana, ICTR-96-17-A, Judgement, ¶ 467 (Dec. 13, 2004)
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 10].

90

SCHABAS, supra note 32, at 310 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 33].

24

order for their execution? An example of the actus reus required for a prosecution under
“extended” joint criminal enterprise is described by the Tadic court:
“An example of this would be a common, shared intention on the part of a group to
forcibly remove members of one ethnicity from their town, village or region (to effect
‘ethnic cleansing’) with the consequence that, in the course of doing so, one or more of
the victims is shot and killed. While murder may not have been explicitly acknowledged
to be part of the common design, it was nevertheless foreseeable that the forcible removal
of civilians at gunpoint might well result in the deaths of one or more of those civilians.
Criminal responsibility may be imputed to all participants with in the common enterprise
where the risk of death occurring was both a predictable consequence of the execution of
the common design and the accused was either reckless or indifferent to that risk.”91
The Appeals chamber in Kvocka stated that:
“in general, there is no specific legal requirement that the accused make a substantial
contribution to the JCE. However, there may be specific cases which require, as an exception to
the general rule, a substantial contribution of the accused to determine whether he participated in
the JCE In practice the significance of the accused’s contribution will be relevant to
demonstrating that the accused shared the intent to pursue the common purpose.”92
One thing to recognize is that there will be a mens rea requirement in determining
whether or not the actus reus of the act can be prosecuted. The text of Article 6(1)93 explicitly
includes individuals who “aided and abetted” in “the preparation or execution” of a crime listed
in Articles 294 to 495 of the ICTR Statute. To further the understanding of these concepts, it will
be necessary to discuss the opinion of the Trial Chamber of the ICTY from the Furundzija case.
a. Furundzija Trial Chamber Judgment.
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The Furundzija case involved the prosecution of a member of the special police known as
the HVO for his involvement in torture and rape.96 In this case there was no tangible evidence
that he participated in or gave direct tangible assistance to the commission of these acts.97 To
determine whether or not his actions consisted of aiding and abetting the court relied on
precedent from the Control Council Law No. 10 in cases heard by U.S. Tribunals and German
courts in the occupied zones and from British military courts. 98 From analyzing these cases it
was determined that there can be differences between the nature of the assistance rendered, and
the effect of the assistance.
To deal with the nature of assistance, the court found that “assistance given by an
accomplice need not be tangible and can consist of moral support in certain circumstances.”99
This is important because it explicitly states that an action only has to be encouraging at times in
order to qualify as the actus reus. A qualifying element would be that the presence of the accused
had a “significant legitimising or encouraging effect on the principals.”100
The effect of the assistance given to the principle need to be conditio sine qua non, or
have a casual relationship with the acts of the accused.101 The Trial Chambers here recognized
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that “the relationship between the acts of the accomplice and of the principal must be such that
the acts of the accomplice make a significant difference to the commission of the criminal act by
the principal.”102 It is further noted that the acts of the accused must have a significant impact
upon the actions of the principle for it to be significant enough to qualify for the actus reus
principle.103
ii. Foreseeability
One of the requirements to prosecute under the “extended” form of joint criminal
enterprise is for the contribution to which the defendant gave to the prosecution to be
foreseeable. The question here is what exactly is the threshold for the foreseeability of the
action taken when dealing with an “extended” form of joint criminal enterprise. Only by
determining the types of actions that are foreseeable can we assess whether or not an individual
can be held liable.
In determining the issue of what is considered foreseeable, the ICTY case Furundzija
provided guidance in how to address the issue. It found that “the clear requirement in the vast
majority of the cases is for the accomplice to have knowledge that his actions will assist the
perpetrator in the commission of the crime.”104 From this definition it will only require for the
perpetrators to be aware of the fact that their actions will likely result in the actions taken for
them to meet this requirement. Furthermore it was found that it was unnecessary for those to be
indicted to have knowledge of all the crimes committed. It is simply sufficient for one crime to
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have occurred out of several for it to have been a foreseeable risk.105 The Amended Indictment
for Cermak reinforces this doctrine as it states “each accused was aware of the substantial
likelihood that the execution of his plans and orders, and the carrying out of the acts and conduct
which he instigated, would involve or result in the crimes charged in this indictment.”106
The logic behind this decision at the ICTY has transferred over to the ICTR. The
Karemera Trial Court adopted the standard of foreseeability from the ICTY.107 From the ICTY
Appeals Chamber in Hadzihasanovic stated “[the accused] must be able to appreciate that the
conduct is criminal in the sense generally understood, without reference to any specific
provision.”108 This interpretation indicates that one can be found to have met the mens rea
requirement of the “extended” form of joint criminal enterprise if with the action they took they
had any reasonable foreseeability that it would result in a criminal action.
It is acknowledged however that there are issues with the foreseeability requirement.
Individuals who participate in a joint criminal enterprise may foresee the actions that they
undertake result in a certain consequence. What if however additional members of the
conspiracy commit further acts or crimes which are not foreseeable? The problem here is that all
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members of the joint criminal enterprise are treated equally, regardless of their contribution.109 It
has been argued that reducing the culpability110 of the individual, for crimes they did not directly
participate in would make for a more optimal solution111.
D. Application of Concepts to Events in Rwanda
i. State Sponsored Radio Stations
Radio Television Libre Mille-Collines (RTLM), also known as “Hate Radio” was used
by the Hutu extremists to coordinate the attacks against the Tutsi. For example, as the Trial
Chamber in Nahimana noted:
“some RTLM broadcasts, as well as the publication of Kangura through March 1994,
preceded the widespread and systematic attack that occurred following the assassination
of President Habyarimana on 6 April 1994 (see paragraph 121). As set forth in paragraph
120, the Chamber has found that systematic attacks against the Tutsi population also took
place prior to 6 April 1994. The Chamber considers that the broadcasting of RTLM and
the publication of Kangura prior to the attack that commenced on 6 April 1994 formed an
integral part of this widespread and systematic attack, as well as the preceding systematic
attacks against the Tutsi population. Similarly, the activities of the CDR that took place
prior to 6 April 1994 formed an integral part of the widespread and systematic attack that
commenced on 6 April, as well as the preceding systematic attacks against the Tutsi
population.” 112
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While it was privately owned, RTLM was “launched [and] backed by family members of
the Hutu President Juvenal Habyarimana”.113 It was specifically formed by private interests as to
not violate the N’sele Cease-fire Agreement between the Government of the Rwandese Republic
and of the Rwandese Patriotic Front.114 The broadcasts from RTLM gave instructions and
coordinated the attacks of the militias. Radio Netherlands reported “[b]etween 1 January 1994
and approximately 31 July 1994, RTLM was used to broadcast messages designed to achieve
interethnic hatred and encourage the population to kill, commits acts of violence and
persecutions against Tutsi population and others on political grounds.”.115 The question arises as
to which theories of individual responsibility could be used to prosecute the members of the
radio for their control or establish of an instrument of government that perpetrated genocide or
other war crime.
a. Superior Responsibility
To prosecute members of RTLM under the theory of superior responsibility requires the
actions of the RTLM steering committee or employees to contain three elements: whether there
was a superior-subordinate relationship, whether the RTLM had knowledge that a crime had or
was going to occur, and if they failed to punish the crime or prevent it from occurring116.
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It will be difficult to assert the first point, in that there was a superior-subordinate
relationship between the members of RTLM and the actions of the government instrument.
While RTLM may have been instrumental in issuing instructions to the militias over the radio
airwaves,117 it will be difficult to assert that RTLM was the superior to the militias.
b. Joint Criminal Enterprise
To prosecute under the theory of joint criminal enterprise, it will be required to
demonstrate that there was a plurality of persons, there is a common plan and there were actions
taken in support of that common plan.118 This theory should be considered in the prosecution of
any official involved with radio.
It is clear that RTLM was used in concert with its listeners, to advocate a common plan,
and that through its broadcasts actions were taken in support of that plan.119 For one to be
indicted on the charges, the individual would have had to in the first place have a substantial
impact. As mentioned in Furundzija, the individual has to contribute significantly to the crime
which had occurred.120 Furthermore, as highlighted in the Kvocka decision, the contributor has to
have the intent to fit within the profile of an individual in a joint criminal enterprise.121 It is
arguable that by broadcasting the locations of targets to the militias, the radio had a substantial
117
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impact to the perpetration of the crimes and they had the intent to participate in a joint criminal
enterprise. Due to the radio’s close ties to the Habyarimana Presidency they effectively had
control of the government’s propaganda arm. For these reasons it is likely that members of the
RTLM can be prosecuted under any of the three categories of joint criminal enterprise
c. Aiding and Abetting
Prosecution of RTLM under the theory of aiding and abetting will require them to meet
the definitions of ‘aiding’ or ‘abetting’122. To further distinguish them from indictment under the
theory of joint criminal enterprise it will require that they lack the status of a co-perpetrator and
that they intended to commit solely the single crime.
It is unlikely that the employees of RTLM will qualify for aiding and abetting. Due to the
high level of integration with the militia units and numerous contacts with the government
officials it is likely that the employees of RTLM had the intent of a common plan which
precludes them from indictment under aiding and abiding.
ii. State Sponsored Militias
The prominent role of militias sponsored by various levels of the government provides an
example of complicity by government officials in Rwanda. It has been documented that local
government collaborated and established the Interahamwe militia prior to the genocide. The
Guardian reported that “three[indicted individuals] were allegedly bourgmestres - mayors - of
local communes in the country, accused of organising and leading the killing in their areas.” 123
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Once the genocide began in full, there is further evidence that the Rwandan government supplied
aid and help to the Interahamwe in carrying out the genocide.124 It is clear that there was a high
level of cooperation between the militia and the government.
a. Superior Responsibility
To prosecute the state sponsored militias would require the militia members to meet three
elements: whether there was a superior-subordinate relationship, whether the militia leaders had
knowledge that a crime had or was going to occur, and if they failed to punish the crime or
prevent it from occurring.125
It is conceivable that this theory will prove viable for prosecuting members of a statesponsored militia. Militias are considered members of armed forces.126 There is a chain of
command, so the superior-subordinate relationship between the commander and his subordinates
exists. If individual leaders of the militia knew that there was or had been a crime, and depending
upon the response it will be appropriate to prosecute them under the theory of superior
responsibility for control of an instrument of the government.
b. Joint Criminal Enterprise
To prosecute members of the militia under the theory of joint criminal enterprise, there
has to be proof that the members of the militia involved more than one person, intent to carry out
a common plan and the common plan was enacted upon. 127
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Since a militia includes more than one person, the first qualification is met. The fact that
they are members of a collective organization indicates that they share an active plan and are
working towards achieving it. As long as the member of the militia made a substantial
contribution to the commission of the crime and the result was foreseeable, they should be found
liable for their actions.
Furthermore, the establishment of the militia prior to the genocide are indicative that
there was a common plan to arm the Hutu population to kill the Tutsi population. 128The high
level of organization across the country indicates that it was clearly foreseeable that the militias
would perpetrate a genocide of the Tutsi population.129 The act of training and organizing these
militias on the local government level indicate that they local mayors gave a substantial
contribution to the effort.130 Local mayors involved in the establishment and control of the
militias are individually liable for their role in the Rwandan genocide.
c. Aiding and Abetting
To distinguish a member of a militia from simply aiding and abiding it is imperative that
the individual assists in the commission of a single crime. Due to the nature of the membership
of the militia and the role that they played in Rwanda, it is unlikely that an individual in a state
sponsored militia will qualify for the crime of aiding and abetting.
iii. State Sponsored Death Sites
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During the 1994 genocide, schools131 and churches132 were used with the complicity of
the government officials to massacre Tutsi and moderate Hutu. As stated in indictment against
Nahimana “[i]n the initial days, the refugees were protected by a few gendarmes and communal
police in these various locations, but subsequently, the refuges were systematically attacked and
massacred by militiamen, often assisted by the same authorities who had promised to protect the
refugees.”133 The issue arises as to which theories of individual responsibility are appropriate for
prosecuting the individuals who helped to establish or control the government instruments
involved.
a. Superior Responsibility
To prosecute an individual for their participation in a superior-subordinate relationship,
there must be a superior-subordinate relationship present, knowledge that a crime had or was
about to occur, and the failure to punish the crime or prevent it from occurring.134 When a state
sponsored death site is involved, all of these factors may be present.
For example, in the Nyarubuye Church massacre, “local Mayor, Sylvestre Gacumbitsi,
gave orders to the police to shoot.”135 There is a clear chain of command here as the police are
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subordinate to the mayor. He had the knowledge that a crime was about to occur and took no
steps to prevent the crime from occurring. However, in this example the mayor instigated the
crime, and would be better prosecuted under the theory of joint criminal enterprise.
b. Joint Criminal Enterprise
The theory of joint criminal enterprise is best suited for prosecuting individuals when
they act in concert with others to further a common plan, and act upon that plan.136 That theory
would likely lead to the successful indictment of a suspect involved with establishing or
controlling a government instrument running a state sponsored death site.
The massacre at Murambi School is one example where prosecution under the theory of
joint criminal enterprise would be appropriate.137 As recorded by journalist Kevin Sites “Hutu
officials use bullhorns to encourage the Tutsi to gather at Murambi School.”138 Multiple officials
were acting to gather the local Tutsi to one central location. Subsequently:
“the Interahamwe descend on the school. They are armed with guns, machetes, grenades
and lances. They attack the weakened Tutsis, beginning a slaughter that will last from the
early morning throughout the next day. Those who attempt to flee are hunted down and
killed with the help of the local population.”139

The high level of coordination used to centralize the location of the Tutsi population and then
execute them indicate that there was a common plan to pursue the genocide of the local Tutsi
population and the actions of the Interahamwe executed the common plan. Due to the
widespread nature of the involvement of government officials in controlling the instruments of
136
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government in controlling the protests, prosecution under all three categories of joint criminal
enterprise is ideal for those who established and controlled the state sanctioned death sites.
c. Aiding and Abetting
To prosecute an individual of aiding and abetting in the involvement of the state
sponsored death sites is another possibility for the prosecutors. It would require the individual to
only have the intent to commit the single crime and not have the intent to participate in a
common plan.140 For example, a local mayor in control of a government institution may be found
guilty for aiding and abiding if he only controlled a single operation against a Tutsi location
independent of all other actions in the genocide. Despite the fact that a common plan existed to
eliminate the Tutsi and moderate Hutu population, if he only perpetrated a single crime
independent to the common plan he lacks the intent to belong to the common plan.141
iv. Church Complicity
During the Rwandan Genocide, “significant numbers of prominent Christians were
involved in the killings.”142 The church leaders themselves were known to have been close the
Habyarimana Presidency and during the genocide “did nothing to discourage the killing.”143 The
question then arises as to which theories of individual responsibility are suitable for determining
the liability of those Church officials and their actions to which they coordinated with the
government.

140

See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Vasiljevic, Case No. IT-98-32-A, Judgement, ¶ 102 (Feb. 25, 2004)
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 28].
141

See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kvocka et al., Case No. IT-98-30/1-A, Judgement, ¶ 90 (Feb. 28,
2004) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 22].

142

SCHELTEMA, supra note 2, at 162 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 32].

143

Id.
37

a. Superior Responsibility
To determine whether the concept of superior responsibility should be applied to the
actions of the church officials in relation to their actions with the government we must consider
three elements: whether there was a superior-subordinate relationship, whether the church
leaders had knowledge that a crime had or was going to occur, and if they failed to punish the
crime or prevent it from occurring.144
The largest problem with applying this theory to the complicity of the church officials is
establishing a superior-subordinate relationship. The church officials themselves had no official
role in the government. The role of the church official was that of a spiritual leader. While they
may have advised the government officials, there was no clear role that the church leaders
actually held positions of authority within the government that would grant them de jure or de
facto control of individuals below them.145 For these reasons the theory of superior responsibility
would likely not be applicable to church officials.
b. Joint Criminal Enterprise
To determine whether the theory of joint criminal enterprise should be applied to the
actions of the church officials it must be determined that there was a plurality of persons there is
a common plan and there were actions taken in support of that common plan. This theory
presents a higher chance to indict and successfully prosecute a church official.
Due to the widespread nature of the genocide, clearly more than one individual was
involved, thus qualifying the actions taken for the first requirement. Next, it would have to be
proved that there was a common plan. As previously mentioned, the execution of the genocide
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across Rwanda is indicative that there was a common plan at the top levels of the Rwandan
society.146 If a church official was involved with the planning and execution of the genocide he
would have been a member of a common plan. Finally, there would have to have been actions
undertaken in support of that common plan. The actions taken by church officials, from refusing
to denounce the interim government147 to moving with them to their new capitol148 implies that
the actions taken by the interim government members was in accordance to a plan. Despite the
indication that church officials meet the broad requirements for indictment under joint criminal
enterprise for all three categories, it will be up to the specific actions of the individual that will
determine under which category they are prosecuted under if any at all.
c. Aiding and Abetting
Prosecution of church officials under the theory of aiding and abetting will require them
to meet the definitions of ‘aiding’ or ‘abetting’149. To further distinguish them from indictment
under the theory of joint criminal enterprise it will require that they lack the status of a coperpetrator and that they intended to commit solely the single crime.150
Depending upon the action of the individual, it may be possible for the church leaders to
be held accountable to this standard. It is conceivable where a church leader could provide a

146

See SCHELTEMA, supra note 2, at 158-161 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 32].

147

See id., at 162.

148

See id.

149

See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Vasiljevic, Case No. IT-98-32-A, Judgement, ¶ 102 (Feb. 25, 2004)
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 28].
150

See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kvocka et al., Case No. IT-98-30/1-A, Judgement, ¶ 90 (Feb. 28,
2004) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 22].

39

substantial contribution to establish a government instrument that commits genocide or another
war crime, yet still lack the intent to belong to a common plan.
IV. Summary and Conclusions
The extent and reliance that one can take the accused’s participation in the government’s
plan or establishment is contingent principally on the nature of the participation. The theories of
superior responsibility, joint criminal enterprise and aiding and abetting as developed in
international tribunal law have been ruled to be applicable to the Rwandan genocide.
An individual in a position of authority presents the prosecution with two options to
prosecute with. Under Article 6(3) of the ICTR Statute the prosecution can charge the individual
for a lack of action despite knowledge that the genocide or other crime against humanity had
occurred. Either statute presents an appropriate way to indict an accused in a position of
authority with a crime.
Under Article 6(1) of the ICTR Statute the prosecution can charge the individual with
their involvement in a common plan. The three categories of joint criminal enterprise present the
prosecution with the chance to indict other individuals who are involved in a common plan to
perpetuate violations of international law. It is a theory refined by the ICTY Chambers and the
ICTR Chambers that allows for the indictment and prosecution of individuals who participate in
a common plan. The three categories allow for the Office of the Prosecutor to charge the
individual despite them not being the principle perpetrators of the crime, as long as they
contributed significantly and foresaw the results of their actions.
The Prosecutor also has the option to indict individuals on the charge of aiding and
abetting for a crime under Article 6(1) of the ICTR Statute. This provides a viable option to
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prosecute those who still violate the ICTR Statute yet lack the common plan required to be a
participant of a joint criminal enterprise.
In conclusion, the Office of the Prosecutor has several options and methods to hold an
individual liable for their actions in establishing or controlling an instrument of government that
masterminds or spearhead an act against the state.
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